In the coming months, it is quite likely that legislation will be enacted, requiring hedge fund managers to register as Investment Advisers with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The proposed legislation 1 would not actually regulate hedge funds or other private pools themselves. Instead, new laws would merely close a loophole that has allowed managers (or "Advisers") to avoid registration and the attendant disclosure, recordkeeping, compliance, proxy voting, inspection and other requirements common to all other investment advisers.
garding fees. The lucrative 2 and 20 3 type fee structure can only exist with this continued favoritism
In contrast, other advisers (including mutual fund managers) are prohibited from charging performance fees based upon their clients' profits.
. agement and sometimes a fulcrum fee.
5 Also, even with registration under the Advisers Act, hedge fund managers would remain free to engage in a variety of self-serving transactions at the expense of fund investors and to take on excessive leverage that can damage investors and the markets. This i because the funds themselves would remain exempt from the Investment Company Act of 1940 (th "1940 .
s e on.
While so much more is needed to protect investors and prevent systemic risk, at the moment neither Congress nor the Administration seem prepared to take more than this small step requiring manager registration. Signs that the process might now be focused more on industry consensus than investor protection were visible in recent Congressional hearings. 10 These problems were common to the hedge fund and mutual fund precursor -the investment trust. The justification for allowing some investment pools (like mutual funds) to be highly regulated and others (like hedge funds) to be unregulated must now be revisited. The bifurcation is based upon assumptions about the skills and behavior of "sophisticated investors." 11 We have learned from LTCM through the most recent global financial crisis that "sophisticated investors" do not have the ability to select and monitor "private" unregulated investment options. Moreover, we can now appreciate that the decisions made by sophisticated investors affect not just them (the direct owners) but the true underlying investors and market integrity.
So long as hedge funds and other investment pools have control over the savings and retirement security of ordinary Americans they should be made safe. And, as long as these pools have the ability individually or collectively to create systemic risk they should also be subject to substantive investment regulations. Accordingly, we should eliminate the loopholes that allow unregistered investment pools broad discretion to operate in the shadows, without transparency or supervision, to engage in self-dealing or related-party transactions, without a fiduciary duty to fund investors, to inaccurately value and inadequately protect assets and to take on excessive leverage and illiquid portfolio holdings. Instead, a 1940-Act "lite" regime should apply to investment pools regardless of whether they are ostensibly offered privately to "sophisticated investors." In other words, some of the substantive protections of the 1940 Act that govern mutual funds should apply to hedge funds. While the federal securities laws generally use disclosure and enforcement as tools to regulate conduct, the country learned in 1929 and again in 2008 that regarding investment pools, disclosure is not enough. Substantive restrictions are more effective tools to protect pools of other people's money.
A full study comparing the investment trust abuses of the early 20 th Century to the problems with some hedge funds today is necessary. In addition, we should not build from the current state of nearly no regulation or oversight. Instead, we should start with the 1940 Act framework. We should then review the 1940 Act and ask for a justification as to why private pools should not be subject to each provision. And, if there is a socially beneficial reason that such a provision would be undesir- of the underlying principles behind the idea that hedge funds could operate with little to no regulatory requirements was that interests in the funds were only sold in private offerings to wealthy investors. These investors were thought to be sufficiently "sophisticated" to protect their interests, and to be able to engage in effective arms-length negotiation in order to achieve fair and equitable terms.") See also, FINRA Funds of Hedge Funds -Higher Costs and Risk for Higher Potential Returns, available at www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/MutualFunds/P006028 ("Historically hedge funds have been offered as unregistered securities that, because of the risks they posed, were only available to a limited number of wealthy, financially sophisticated investors.") able, we should not simply create an exemption, but consider whether a "lighter" provision might be suitable.
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The freedom from regulation uniquely afforded to hedge funds and other private pools of capital is premised upon oft-repeated, but questionable premises. Those who resist meaningful substantive regulation of hedge fund operations and investment practices continue to rely upon these "myths."
In the interest of clarity, in its conclusion this issue brief offers reality to replace these myths.
Dispelling the Top Ten Myths about Hedge Funds
Myth 1: Hedge funds investors are all high net worth individuals. Reality 1: Americans of modest means are invested in hedge funds through financial intermediaries. These include pension fund beneficiaries, mutual fund investors and others whose savings and future retirement income are exposed to unregulated hedge funds and other so-called "private" pools.
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While the "direct" owner of a limited partnership interest in a hedge fund might be an institution, the institution often is merely a middleman, investing other people's money. In addition with the "retailization" of hedge funds through the fund-of-fund structure, a broader range of ordinary individuals are exposed both to riskier investments and higher management fees.
14 Myth 2: Hedge funds direct investors are financially "sophisticated." Reality 2: "Direct investors" or owners are those who have the authority directly to purchase interests in hedge funds on their own account or, typically, as a financial intermediary on behalf of many others. These direct investors are designated to be sophisticated based upon assets or wealth alone. There are no special skills or knowledge required of an individual before he directly purchases interest in a hedge fund. For real people who directly invest in hedge funds, the "sophistication" test is asset or income based. For example, someone with an annual salary of $200,000 can qualify to be a direct investor.
Myth 3: Sophisticated investors have the ability to select and monitor private offerings without the need of government protections Reality 3: Even the most financial savvy of investors including Nobel prize-winning economists and other highly educated and trained individuals have lost huge sums by selecting untrustworthy hedge fund managers or unreasonably relying upon risky strategies and excessive leverage. When subject to lawsuits, many whom the law deems to be "sophisticated investors" claim they did not have the ability to select and monitor hedge funds. Sophisticated investors can neither take care of themselves nor 12 For example, the 7-day redemption requirement for mutual funds may not be desirable for hedge funds. The obligation to stand ready to redeem shares places pressure on mutual funds in terms of investment choices and liquidity. There are many hedge fund strategies that require stickier capital. Examples may be used to illustrate how these types of investments can improve corporate governance and performance of underlying portfolio investments. 
ECONOMIS
14 These fund-of-hedge fund structures are more costly to investors than traditional mutual funds. Direct fees and expenses (the expense ratio) is usually around 2.15% compared to an average of 1.36%. In addition, FINRA noted that managers of a fund of funds receives an addition 10% of annual gain above an 8% benchmark. Other experts observe that the performance fee is 5% or 10%.
the investors who entrust them with their money. They have proven to be no match to the complexity and fraud that arises in an opaque market. Moreover the failures of sophisticated investors impact the market as a whole. Since and including the collapse of LTCM, the news pages are filled with stories of institutions and individuals who meet the legal definitions of "sophistication" being duped or swindled.
Myth 4: Hedge funds are offered privately. Reality 4: To be a private offering, what is critical under the Supreme Court's view is not just the number of people to whom the offer is made, but whether the investors can "fend for themselves" 15 without the need of detailed disclosures or protections. History has shown that those who select hedge funds are not capable of fending for themselves. Moreover the public at large is exposed with their savings channeled into unregulated funds through use of intermediary legal structures which "hide" the public faces and undercount the number of people who have assets at risk.
Myth 5: Hedge funds were not a contributor to the global financial crisis Reality 5: Hedge funds did contribute to the global financial crisis in meaningful ways. However, this is a red herring. The need to regulate hedge funds pre-dated the global financial crisis and problems associated with hedge funds still exist. The most common objection to proposed regulation of hedge funds is the claim that hedge funds did not cause this crisis. Yet, hedge funds did play an important role. The convergence of undercapitalized mortgage pools, credit default swaps and leveraged hedge funds created the perfect storm.
16 Hedge funds were willing buyers of risky tranches of subprime mortgage-backed CDOs.
17 In addition, they were big players in the credit default swap market. The collapse of the two Bearn Stearns hedge funds signaled a transformation of the subprime crisis into a much larger credit problem. Unregulated hedge funds are a problem due to the harm they can cause to investors and the markets because they cannot withstand market turmoil. The need to deleverage during the financial crisis created broader problems. Most importantly the techniques used by hedge funds were the cause of this crisis and earlier meltdowns and crashes. Restricting a dangerous behavior makes sense regardless of who the market player is. Excessive leverage was a chief contributor to the collapse and we know that hedge funds have no leverage restrictions. The greatest leverage were broker-dealers and hedge funds at 27 to 1. At the other end of the spectrum were commercial banks (9.8 to 1) and savings banks (8.7 to 1). 18 We do not know the full extent of economic leverage because there is not uniform of clear disclosure. Limiting leverage ratios, should not offend those hedge funds that act responsibly. 15 SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953 Myth 6: Since many hedge funds offer market benefits, we must not place any limits on risky techniques used by other hedge funds.
Reality 6: Not all hedge funds use leverage, and many hedge funds have positive effects on the market. Some activist hedge funds can improve long-term shareholder value. Some pressure entrenched management to create long term shareholder value. They also have the potential to mitigate risk and perform better than the market index during bear markets. However, one does not need to overlook the benefits of some hedge funds to recognize the dangers others have, do and can cause due to their unlimited investment options. At the heart of the sudden, massive failure of LTCM was leverage. It had capital of around $4.8 billion, but assets of more than $125 billion and was said to have derivatives positions with a notional value of $1.25 trillion. In a report after the event, the President's Working Group noted: " that excessive leverage can greatly magnify the negative effects of any event or series of events on the financial system as a whole. The near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management . . . highlighted the possibility that problems at one financial institution could be transmitted to other institutions, and potentially pose risks to the financial system. 19 This was not an isolated event. There were several more hedge fund scandals, including in 2006, when Amaranth Advisors lost $6.4 billion of its $9 billion in assets as a result of aggressive speculation in the natural gas markets. 20 At the time, of this various scandals, many recognized the failure of private constraints on excessive risk taking by unregulated pools of capital. The President's Working Group wrote that "Our market-based economy relies primarily on market discipline to constrain leverage. But market discipline can break down." 21 Nevertheless, many of the recommendations in the report were never implemented. There was no recommendation for outright regulation of hedge funds or restrictions on hedge fund leverage.
Myth 7:
Hedge funds are not significant market players Reality 7: At the recent peak, hedge fund had assets totaling around $1.9 trillion. Presently hedge fund assets are $1.5 trillion. While this may seem small relative to the mutual fund industry worldwide, it is worth noting that US mutual fund assets were at that same level in the early 1990s. While there are more than 18,000 hedge funds across the globe, the assets are highly concentrated with 75% of the assets are managed by approximately 200 firms, each with more than $1 billion under management. Recently hedge funds were said to make 30% of all US fixed income trades, including 85% of distressed debt and 80% of certain credit derivative trades. 
